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DUE PROCESS AND PROBATION REVOCATION: THE
WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
In Morrissey v. Brewer, I the Supreme Court determined that although
a parole2 revocation hearing3 does not trigger "the full panoply of protec-
tive rights due a defendant" 4 in a criminal proceeding,5 the liberty6 issues
involved do implicate significant rights7 protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 The Court established that certain
1. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2. Parole concerns conditional release from prison. See id. at 496 n.6 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see, eg., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole,
effective November 1, 1987. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017, 2031, amended by
Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1266 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 4106 (d) (Supp. IV 1986)).
3. A parole revocation hearing determines whether a violation of parole has oc-
curred and, if so, whether the offender should be reincarcerated. See Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972).
4. Id. at 480.
5. A "criminal proceeding" means a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of an
individual accused of a particular crime. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law
§ 1.7, at 37 (2d ed. 1986). A parole revocation hearing differs from a criminal proceeding
in numerous ways. A revocation hearing establishes a particular finding upon which the
tribunal may exercise its discretion to continue or revoke the conditional liberty. See 18
U.S.C. § 3565 (Supp. IV. 1986).
Morrissey holds that revocation of parole does not constitute part of the criminal pro-
ceeding. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. Parole occurs after adjudication of guilt, partial
service of the convict's sentence, and a determination that the individual is prepared to
return to society, but is undeserving of the absolute liberty enjoyed by law-abiding citi-
zens. See icL Revocation, therefore, involves the deprivation of only a conditional lib-
erty. See id; see also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (defining conditional
liberty).
Disparities in procedure clearly distinguish a revocation hearing from a criminal trial.
Formal rules of evidence strictly govern the criminal proceedings, while if employed at all
at a revocation hearing, their impact is considerably relaxed. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973). Moreover, in criminal trials, juries try the questions of fact.
The judge, who is well-acquainted with the subject matter, see id., makes all determina-
tions in revocation hearings. See id. In a revocation proceeding, the state need not satisfy
the traditional criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather it must estab-
lish reasonable grounds for belief that a violation has occurred. See Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 485; see also United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying a
"reasonably satisfied" standard); United States v. Rice, 671 F.2d 455, 458 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (same); Merritt, Parole Revocation.: A Primer, 11 U. Tol. L. Rev. 893, 907-09
(1980) (discussing burden of proof in revocation hearings). This standard requires more
than mere probable cause. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488. The cumulative effect of these
differences provided the basis for the Supreme Court's decision to grant parole revocation
hearings less than the full constitutional protections traditionally accorded in a criminal
proceeding. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973).
6. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
7. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
8. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472. The due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment provides in pertinent part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In Morrixsey, the
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minimum requirements of due process apply to all parole revocation
hearings.9 It subsequently extended the same minimum requirements to
probation 0 revocation hearings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli," noting parole
and probation are "constitutionally indistinguishable."' 2
One requirement, enunciated in Morrissey and incorporated in Gag-
non, focuses on the probationer's right to receive a written statement by
the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
probation.' 3 The courts refer to this mandate as the written statement
requirement. 14 Most recently, the Supreme Court's opinion, in Black v.
Romano,15 reiterates the necessity for the written statement.1 6 Neither
Supreme Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment to require the states to exercise a
degree of care prior to revoking parole. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472, 482. The fifth
amendment ensures that the same due process requirements apply to the federal govern-
ment. Cf U.S. Const. amend. V.
9. The Morrissey Court enumerated six basic protections necessary to satisfy due
process at the parole revocation hearing:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses... ; (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body
such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial of-
ficers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evi-
dence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
10. The word probation derives from Latin, meaning "the period of proving or trial."
P. Cromwell, Jr., G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & C. Walker, Probation and Parole in the
Criminal Justice System 391 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter Cromwell]. The Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984 technically classifies probation as a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)
(Supp. IV 1986); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3271. Probation, however, evades simple definition as it is
used in a variety of contexts. See R. Gray, Probation: An Exploration in Meaning, 50
Fed. Probation Dec. 1986, at 26. As commonly conceived probation reflects a compre-
hensive concept that relates to various aspects within the broader framework of criminal
jurisprudence: probation is viewed as a process that encompasses the functions, activities,
and services that constitute the probationary system's interaction with the courts, the
offender, and the community. See Cromwell, supra, at 391. This Note focuses primarily
on the process aspect of probation.
11. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
12. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973); infra note 104 and accom-
panying text. Analysis of parole cases, therefore, is germane to the construction of the
due process requirements of probation revocation hearings.
13. See id. at 782 (incorporating the procedural requirements of Morrissey); cf Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)
(per curiam); Baumgardner v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct. App.
1985). The written statement requirement extends beyond parole and probation revoca-
tion processes. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980) (inmates transferred
to mental institutions); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1974) (good time
credits taken away from prison inmates); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)
(public welfare benefits).
15. 471 U.S. 606 (1985).
16. Id. at 612-14.
PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS
Morrissey, 7 Scarpelli, " nor Black,' 9 however, discusses the form such a
statement must take.
The Supreme Court's failure to address this issue has engendered a
controversy over the constitutionally acceptable form of the written
statement in probation revocation cases.2° Probation revocation hearings
take place before the sentencing court.2 ' The majority position asserts
that an oral statement by the trial judge indicating her reasons for the
revocation, transcribed by the court reporter,' satisfies due process and
eliminates the need for an independent written statement.3 This view
contends that the Morrissey written statement requirement was adopted
to ensure accurate fact-finding and to provide a sufficient basis for appel-
late review. 24 The verbatim transcript fulfills these objectives and pro-
vides constitutionally adequate protection.25
The opposing view, espousing a stricter standard, requires that the de-
fendant receive an independent written statement that provides the rea-
17. Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
18. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
19. See Black, 471 U.S. at 612-14.
20. The Supreme Court in Black determined that the memorandum issued by the
sentencing court in conjunction with the transcript of the hearing satisfied the written
statement requirement. See id. at 616. The Court, however, discussed neither the con-
tent of the memorandum nor the reasons for its adequacy. The question of whether a
detailed transcript alone, may prove constitutionally adequate, remains unresolved. See
Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 98 & n.l 1 (D.C. 1986) (acknowledging conflict-
ing interpretations since Black).
21. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2001 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. III
1985)); Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2002 codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b), 3603(g)
(Supp. III 1985)). Both Morrissey and Gagnon involved administrative proceedings
before a nonjudicial forum. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985).
22. Statute requires federal courts to record all hearings and to supply transcripts
upon request. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1982). See, eg., United States ex reL Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1973) (in prison disciplinary matter, only
statement of disposition permitted was one or two sentences on original conduct report),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 194-95, 198 (2d
Cir. 1971) (en banc) (no requirement to record hearing and issue written decision for
every serious prison disciplinary proceeding), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
23. See United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct 1239 (1988) (mem.); Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 745 n.1 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (per curiam);
United States v. Lacey, 648 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 961 (1982); United States v. Rilliet, 595 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam).
The dictates of Morrissey and Gagnon apply with equal force to the states. See Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472, 487-90
(1972). Thus, numerous state courts sanction the verbatim transcript approach. See,
e-g., State v. Moreno, 21 Ariz. App. 462, 465, 520 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1974); State v. For-
tier, 20 Or. App. 613, 615, 533 P.2d 187, 190 (1975); State v. Myers, 86 Wash. 2d 419,
429, 545 P.2d 538, 544 (1976) (en banc).
24. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1984); United States v. Yancey, 827
F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 1239 (1988) (mem.); Saunders v.
United States, 508 A.2d 92, 97 (D.C. 1986).
25. See Yancey, 827 F.2d at 89; Saunders, 508 A.2d at 97-98.
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sons for the revocation of probation.26 By requiring the issuance of a
separate written statement, the minority holds steadfastly to the belief
that due process requirements set forth by the Supreme Court mandate
exacting application.27
Part I of this Note examines the historical antecedents and the admin-
istration of the probation system, focusing on the model first adopted by
the federal government. Part II traces the development of the due pro-
cess protections in probation revocation hearings. Part III investigates
the viability of the competing interpretations of the written statement
requirement and balances the policy considerations implicated by the
written statement requirement. This Note concludes that a verbatim
transcript setting forth the evidence and reasons for the probation revo-
cation satisfies procedural due process requirements.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
FEDERAL PROBATION SYSTEM
Probation represents one of the many rehabilitative options available
to the criminal justice system today.2" Probation offers a popular re-
sponse29 to overcrowded prisons3° and the economic burdens of incarcer-
26. See United States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1985); Kartman v. Par-
ratt, 535 F.2d 450, 457-58 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bonanno, 452 F. Supp. 743,
747 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979).
Although the Smith decision represents a minority view within the federal system,
several state court opinions interpreting both state and federal due process requirements
support this interpretation. See, e.g., Joiner v. State, 454 So. 2d 1048, 1049 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1984); Taylor v. State, 405 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Borst v. State 377
So. 2d 3, 4 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1985); Baumgardner v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct. App.
1986).
27. See United States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Bonanno, 452 F. Supp 743, 747 (N.D. Cal 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.
1979); Taylor v. State, 405 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).
28. The Sentencing Reform Act provides for sentencing alternatives including: im-
prisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3581 (Supp. III 1985); making restitution to the victims, see
18 U.S.C. § 3556 (Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986); fines, see 18 U.S.C. § 357 1(b) (Supp.
III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986); notice and reasonable explanation of the conviction to the
victims, so that victims may seek appropriate civil redress, see 18 U.S.C. § 3555 (Supp.
III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986); and probation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (Supp III 1985 & Supp
IV 1986). See also The United States Courts: A Pictorial Summary for the Twelve Month
Period Ended June 30, 1981, at 17 (Administrative Office of the United States Courts
1981), reprinted in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1984 at 622 (E. McGarrell &
T. Flanagan eds.) [hereinafter Sourcebook 1984] (chart depicting various types of correc-
tional supervision under Federal Probation System).
29. In 1984, federal prisons housed 221,815 inmates. See United States Department
of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, The 1983 Jail Census, Bulletin NCJ-95536, at 2
(Wash., D.C. Dept. of Justice, Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Jail Census], reprinted in
Sourcebook 1984, supra note 28, at 640. During the same year, federal judges sentenced
817,042 offenders to probation. See id. at 616. See generally The Federal Judicial Center,
An Introduction to the Federal Probation System Q 41-43 app. (1976) [hereinafter Fed-
eral Probation].
30. In 1987, the adult prison population nationwide swelled to over half a million
inmates, representing the most expansive decade of prison population growth yet exper-
[Vol. 56
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ation.3s More than one-half of all offenders are sentenced to probation.32
The main purpose of probation is to offer an alternative to confinement
that also serves to rehabilitate the offender a.3  The theory underlying pro-
bation assumes that reintegrating the convict into society as a useful and
productive member, rather than incarcerating her, provides her with in-
centive to reform. 34 The guilty defendant receives a chance to prove her
repentance and reformation through peaceful reintegration. 35
ienced. See New York Times, April 25, 1988, at 1, col. 3. During the period 1980
through 1987, prison population increased by 76%-from 329,821 inmates to a current
total of 581,609. See United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Prisoners in 1987, Bulletin NCJ-110331, at 1 (Wash., D.C. Dept. of Justice, Apr. 1988)
[hereinafter Prisoners in 1987]. The decrease in the number of facilities available to
house these offenders, compounded the problem. From 1978-83, available penological
institutions in the correctional system nationwide decreased 4%. See Jail Census, supra
note 29, at 2, reprinted in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1986, 393 (K. Jamie-
son & T. Flanagan eds. 1986) [hereinafter Sourcebook 1986]. Federal prisons have been
estimated as operating between 37%-73% in excess of capacity. See Prisoners in 1987,
supra note 30, at 2.
31. In 1978 the cost of supervising a federal probationer has been estimated at S.67
per day, or about 1/11 of the $7.54 per day it costs to maintain an institutionalized
offender. See Campbell, The Law of Sentencing 74 (1978). More recent estimates have
placed probation at 1/14th the cost of imprisonment. See ABA Standards § 18-2.3 (2d.
ed. 1980); see generally Federal Probation, supra note 29, at Q-42 app.; J. Smykla, Proba-
tion and Parole: Crime Control in the Community 178 (1984).
Professor Smykla contends that in 1979 the federal government spent S385 million
dollars to supervise approximately 1.5 million individuals on probation and parole. See
J. Smykla, supra, at 178. In contrast, for the same year the prison system expended S3
billion dollars to supervise only 400,000 adults and juveniles incarcerated at that time.
See id. While these figures clearly emphasize the cost benefits of parole and probation,
Professor Smykla cautions that a comprehensive system of crime control could effectively
eliminate the large cost disparity. Id. at 177-78. The implementation of, and accessibility
to, costly social programs for community released offenders would raise the expenditure
necessary for effective probation and parole programs. See id.
32. See U.S. Department of Justice, Statistics, Prison Admissions and Releases 1983,
Special Report NCJ-100582 at 2, Table 1, 6, Table 8, (admission figures for thirty states'
prisons); U.S. Department of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Bulletin 1985, NCJ-
103683 at 2, reprinted in Sourcebook 1986, supra note 30, at 387 (total state and federal
probation entries for 1985); Federal Probation, supra note 29, at Q-41 app.
33. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); United States v. Murray,
275 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1928); U.S. v. Torres-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932)). During the debates over the
Federal Probation Act, see Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259, sponsors of
the bill emphasized that probation extended the opportunity for rehabilitation by giving
the offender a chance to reform outside of prison. See H.R. Rep. No. 1377, 68th Cong.,
2d. Sess. 2 (1925) ("probationer is encouraged in industrious, law-abiding habits" (memo
in support of probation bill submitted by Sen. Copeland and Rep. Graham)). The legisla-
tive history of the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-3566 (Supp. IV 1987), also
reflects the rehabilitative aspect of probation. Probation makes available the options of
"educational opportunit[ies and] vocational training." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d.
Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3274.
34. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Muggins
192 Neb 415, 420, 222 N.W.2d 289, 292 (1974); see generally N. Cohen & J. Gobert, The
Law of Probation and Parole 182-83 (1983); R. Henningsen, Probation and Parole 6-7
(G. Killinger ed.) (1981).
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 1377, supra note 33, at 2.
1988]
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English courts used probationary practices as early as the fourteenth
century. 36 These practices evolved as society moved away from a retrib-
utive approach to crime37 and toward an enlightened sentiment of Chris-
tian charity 38 that embraced rehabilitation as a more effective means of
combating crime.39  Not until the nineteenth century did the
psychosocial justification of probation attach as a method for treating
antisocial behavior.4'
During the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, 41 practices
such as conditional release on bail,4" "benefit of clergy,"'43 judicial re-
prieve,' filing of cases, 45 and release on one's own recognizance 4 6 fore-
shadowed the adoption of a comprehensive probationary system.4 7
English prison reform of the late eighteenth century sought more hu-
mane conditions for prisoners,48 which further contributed to this devel-
opment. Finally, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, English
concern for the treatment of juvenile and first-time offenders produced
various experiments with probationary tactics intended "to save young
and inexperienced offenders from the stigma of prison."
49
The practice of probation developed much later in the United States.
Massachusetts enacted the nation's earliest probation procedures in the
late nineteenth century.5" Favorable results there sparked similar legisla-
36. See Federal Probation, supra note 29, at 4. See generally C. Chute & M. Bell,
Crime Courts and Probation 10-30 (1956) (outlining chronology of early British
practices).
37. See C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 2-5; S. Rubin, H. Weihofen, G. Ed-
wards & S. Rosenzweig, The Law of Criminal Correction 176-79, 543-46 (1963) [herein-
after Rubin].
38. See R. Gray, Probation: An Exploration in Meaning, 40 Fed. Probation 26, 30
(1986).
39. See Rubin, supra note 38, at 176-79, 543-46.
40. See R. Gray, supra note 37, at 26.
41. See generally C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 10-17.
42. See C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 10-26. See generally R. Henningsen,
supra note 34, at 14 (offender released if some type of security issued on his behalf).
43. This special dispensation, originated by the church, afforded members of the
clergy and literate aristocracy a more lenient sentence after reciting a passage from the
psalm Miserere Me in the bishop's court. See R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 13. See
generally C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 12-15.
44. Judicial reprieve involved either a temporary stay of sentence, allowing the de-
fendant time to apply for a pardon, or release due to court suspicion that the evidence
presented was insufficient to impose a sentence. See R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 13.
45. The filing of cases effected a suspension of sentence upon consent of both the
prosecutor and the defendant. See R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 14.
46. This practice allowed the state to release people suspected of committing crimes
in return for a promise not to commit such offenses in the future, creating, in effect, a
bond or surety for law-abiding behavior. See R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 13-14.
47. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 7 n.31 (citing United Nations The
Legal Origins of Probation, in Probation and Parole; Selected Readings 3 (R. Carter & L.
Wilking eds. 1970)).
48. See C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 20-22.
49. Id. at 22.
50. See C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note, 36 at 58-59 (citing Massachusetts Acts 1878,
[Vol. 56
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tive action among various states.5
The federal government, however, lagged behind the states in enacting
probation legislation.52 Nevertheless, lower federal courts routinely
granted probation as a sentencing option.53 In 1916, the Supreme Court
condemned the common law practice as an abdication of the court's sen-
tencing duty, and firmly held that probation was not a legitimate sentenc-
ing option.54 Placing the offender on probation was deemed beyond the
scope of the judiciary and infinged upon the separation of powers.55 This
decision set into motion Congressional efforts to create a federal proba-
tion system.5 6 These efforts culminated nine years later, when Congress
passed the bill creating a comprehensive federal probation system5 7 (the
"Probation Act" or the "Act"), currently subsumed under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984.58
With its passage, the Act established a uniform system of probation.59
The statute conferred broad powers upon the sentencing judge in setting
the terms and conditions of probation.' Commitment to the rehabilita-
Ch. 198, § 1); Cromwell, supra note 10, at 10-12; Federal Probation, supra note 29, at 4.
See generally R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 14.
51. See C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 67-68; N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra
note 34, at 7; Federal Probation, supra note 29, at 4; R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 14-
15; J. Smykla, supra note 31, at 67-68; cf A. Smith & L. Berlin, Introduction to Proba-
tion and Parole 81 (1976) (adult probation statutes not adopted nationwide until 1967).
52. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 8.
53. See Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 50-52 (1916).
54. Ia
55. See id at 51-52; see also Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312, 315 (1937) (purpose of Act
to cure judiciary's lack of power to suspend sentence) (citing Ex parte United States).
56. See Exparte United States, 242 U.S. at 51-52; see also I Henningsen, supra note
34, at 15 (describing the impact of Exparte United States [commonly known as the Killits
decision] on the development of a federal probation system).
57. Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259. The Act provided that upon
entering judgment of conviction for crimes not punishable by death or life imprisonment,
and when in the court's discretion:
it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the
best interests of the public, as well as the defendant, will be subserved thereby,
[the court] shall have the power ... to suspend the imposition or execution of
sentence and to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as they may deem best.
Id
58. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) amended by Pub. L No. 100-
182, 100 Stat. 1268 (1987) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-3566 (Supp. IV. 1986)). See
generally S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3224, 3232-35, 3242, 3250-3251.
59. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 36, at 8; R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at
15. See generally Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259-60.
60. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932); Porth v. Templar 453
F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 181, 185-86 (1967) (state probation statutes grant broad discretion to trial
court); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (Supp. IV 1986) (present statutory framework under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, requires imposition of certain mandatory conditions as
well as option to choose from a nonexhaustive list of discretionary conditions).
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tive function of probation, 6' nevertheless, motivated courts to limit con-
ditions of probation to those reasonably related to the achievement of
this goal. 62 In response to earlier judicial concern over maintaining sepa-
ration of powers,63 the Probation Act also specifically vested power in the
sentencing court to revoke or modify any condition of probation.'
Passage of the Act coincided with a realignment in federal penological
thought. Traditionally, imprisonment and other sanctions served to fur-
ther the retributive goals of the criminal justice system.65 Reformers,
however, argued that the purpose of sanctions against convicts should be
to rehabilitate the offenders.6 6 Rehabilitation, therefore, was a motivat-
ing factor in the passage of the Probation Act.67 As a result, probation
was viewed as a humanitarian and favorable alternative to prison. 6 This
sentiment, coupled with broad judicial discretion to administer the sys-
tem,69 engendered an atmosphere of hostility and resistence toward af-
fording procedural due process protections to the violating probationer;7"
courts believed that the manifest benevolence of probation estopped the
offender from requesting greater procedural protections.7
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, THE LIBERTY INTEREST, AND
PROBATION REVOCATION
A. Constitutional Due Process
The due process clauses of the fifth72 and fourteenth 73 amendments
61. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932); United States v. Winsett,
518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975).
62. See Bums, 287 U.S. at 220-21; Winsett, 518 F.2d at 54-55; Note, supra note 60, at
185. But see United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1980) (condi-
tions need not strictly further rehabilitative goal); Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation:
An Analysis, 51 Geo. L.J. 809, 810 (1963) (frequently courts imposed conditions that
served neither the rehabilitative purpose of probation nor the societal interests involved).
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the sentencing judge should consider the
following four basic objectives in formulating the various sentencing options: deterrence;
incapacitation; just punishment; and rehabilitation. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d.
Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3250.
63. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916); see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
64. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, ch. 211, § 3562, 98 Stat. 1992, currently
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3652 (Supp. III 1985). See generally Best & Birzon, supra note 62,
at 817-19.
65. See C. Chute & M. Bell, supra note 36, at 1-5, 8; Cromwell, supra note 10, at 5.
66. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 36, at 7; R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at
14; see also supra note 33.
67. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975);
see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 51 (1916).
69. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932); supra note 60 and ac-
companying text.
70. See Burns, 287 U.S. at 223; infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
71. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S.
216, 220 (1932); infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
72. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
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protect the populace from capricious government action.74 Due process
ensures against the deprivation of an individual's interest in life, liberty,
or property without adequate procedural protection."' The liberty inter-
est primarily contemplates freedom from bodily restraint.76 When an in-
dividual stands to suffer a grievous loss," the right or benefit implicated
may not be terminated without affording the person appropriate protec-
tions.78 Revocation of probation, which may result in imprisonment,""
implicates the grievous loss of this liberty interest.8" While the liberty
interest at stake in a revocation proceeding is not absolute,8" this condi-
tional liberty deserves procedural protection.82 The next logical inquiry
73. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
75. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 452 (3d ed. 1986)
rhereinafter Rotunda II]. The government has no affirmative duty to institute procedural
protections unless an action constitutes an abusive deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds,
(Powell, J., concurring) Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The difficulty arises in
defining precisely which claims fall within the contemplation of a protected interest. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972); see also Rotunda, infra note 191 at 415 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court's refusal to define "life").
76. Protection of physical liberty is the oldest and most accepted interpretation of this
due process guarantee. See, eg., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977). See
generally Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in those Clauses in the
Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property." 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 365 (1891). The Supreme Court also has determined that various other claims fall
within the protected status granted by the liberty interest. See generally Rotunda II,
supra note 75, at 468-72.
77. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). A grievous loss may best be defined by an analysis of the
cases which have granted grievous loss status, see, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 (1973) (revocation of probation); Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (rev-
ocation of parole); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (loss of welfare benefits);
Shepard v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1976) (loss of
eligibility for rehabilitative programs or postponement of parole), vacated, 429 U.S. 1057
(1977), or denied grievous loss status, see, eg., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska
Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979) (parole release merely an expec-
tation, denial of which does not rise to level of protected grievous loss); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (valid conviction constitutionally deprives liberty inter-
est); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896
(1961) (property interest of government employee in retaining employment may be sum-
marily terminated).
78. See Anti-Facist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(1)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (upon violation of probation, court
may "continue him on probation ... [or] revoke the sentence of probation and impose
any other sentence that was available... at the time of the initial sentencing").
80. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972).
81. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 9 (1979); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). A liberty interest is conditional if the offender may be required
to engage in or refrain from engaging in certain activities as a precondition to release. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (Supp. IV 1986)
(conditions applicable to probation); supra notes 60-62.
82. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
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asks What process is due?83
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,84 specified three factors
that must be weighed in any adequacy-of-process-analysis: the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; the probable
value, if any, of additional safeguards; and the governmental interest in
avoiding any fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedure entails.85 In the context of probation revocation hear-
ings, the assessment of the probable value of substitute procedural
safeguards is especially significant.86
B. Judicial Evolution of Procedural Due Process in Probation
Revocation Hearings
Traditionally, the judiciary's approach to the concept of procedural
due process reflected a disposition toward flexibility. 7 In the area of
probation revocation, this bias originally inspired opposition toward the
application of procedural due process,88 illustrated by the reluctance of
the courts to expand the protections afforded to the convicted.89 In par-
ticular, judicial disenchantment with probation reflected the sentiment of
numerous judges opposed to the concept of rehabilitative punishment. 90
U.S. 1, 12 (1979); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1972).
83. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483.
84. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976).
85. Id. at 332-35.
86. See infra notes 113-46 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Com-
plex, 442 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); FCC v. WJR, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No.
108, 111 U.S. 701, 708-09 (1884).
88. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-90 (1972); Burns v. United States, 287
U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
89. See Evjen, The Federal Probation System: The Struggle to Achieve It and Its First
25 Years, 39 Fed. Probation, June 1975, at 3.
90. This response to the concept of a national probation act by Judge Westenhaver of
the Northern District of Ohio is typical:
Replying to your request for my opinion, I beg to say that I am opposed to the
bill in its entirety. In my opinion, the power to suspend sentence and place
offenders on [probation] should not be confided to the district judges nor any-
one else .... In my opinion, the suspension, indeterminate sentence and parole
systems wherever they exist, are one of the main causes contributing to the
demoralization of the administration of criminal justice .... I sincerely hope
your organization will abandon this project.
Letter from D.C. Westenhaver, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Ohio, Dec. 14,
1923 to Charles L. Chute (an active advocate of the Probation Act), reprinted in Evjen,
supra note 89, at 5 (use of the term parole instead of probation reflects an error com-
monly made even by those who should be familiar with the terminology); see also Letter
from John F. McGee, U.S. District Judge, Minnesota Dec. 19, 1923 to Charles L. Chute,
reprinted in Evjen, supra note 89, at 5; Letter from Honorable Arthur J. Tuttle, of Detroit
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As a result of this recalcitrance, the courts developed numerous theories
to justify limiting procedural protections in probation revocation hear-
ings.9 Restrictive rights theories-the grace theory,92 the contract the-
ory," and the legal custody theory94 -provided the courts with various
rationales to support denial of procedural due process or, at the very
least, curtail the quantum and quality of the protections available during
probation revocation hearings. 9 5
The Supreme Court initially viewed the revocation hearing as serving
the sole purpose of enabling the probationer to defend against the
claimed violation.96 This appearance, therefore, did not entitle the ac-
cused to a trial or formalized procedure. 97 It was not until the gradual
Dec. 14, 1923 to Charles L. Chute, reprinted in Evjen, supra note 89, at 5 (expressing
similar sentiments). This resistance contributed to the long battle in the development of a
national probation system. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 8 (development
of a uniform federal probation system took nine years); Evjen, supra note 89, at 3-4. For
a discussion of other factors affecting passage of the probation bill, see C. Chute & M.
Bell, supra note 36, at 104 (principal reason for failure of probation bill due to the vocifer-
ous opposition of fanatic prohibitionists).
91. See Fisher, Probation and Parole Revocation.: The Anomaly of Divergent Proce-
dures, 38 Fed. Probation, Sept. 1974, at 24 [hereinafter Fisher I; Fisher, Parole and
Probation Revocation Procedures After Morrissey and Gagnon, 65 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 46, 47-49 (1974) [hereinafter Fisher II]; Note, supra note 60, at 191-92.
92. Under the grace theory, courts considered probation a gift, and therefore it was
revocable upon violation of any of the specified conditions of the gift. See Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935); Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
93. This theory deemed the signing of the conditions of probation to give rise to a
contract between the state and the probationer. See Fisher I, supra note 91, at 24. By
accepting the conditions, the convict implicitly relinquished all claims to future objec-
tions to the terms. See, e.g., People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 608, 61 P.2d
352, 352-54 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d
842, 844 (1952); see also Note, supra note 60, at 191-92. As a result, the probationer
could not repudiate the agreement without risking imprisonment. See Fisher I, supra
note 91, at 24.
94. This theory is premised upon the belief that the probationer remains under legal
custody of the court. Cf Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 258-59 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing
retaking and rearrest of parolee), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). Two subtheories
spawned from the legal custody theory. The first subtheory, the exhausted rights doc-
trine, viewed the defendant as having depleted all due process rights during the original
trial and sentencing. See Fisher I, supra note 91, at 24; Fisher II, supra note 91, at 48.
Thus, the postconviction status remained insulated from the protections of the fifth and
sixth amendments. See Fisher I, supra note 91, at 24. Revocation, therefore, could take
place in the absence of the protections traditionally afforded by these amendments. See
id at 24.
The second subtheory, the parens patriae rationale, considered both the state and the
offender as having a common interest in rehabilitation. See Fisher II, supro note 91, at
48; Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 284, 289 (1971). This bond drew
the two entities together, eliminating the need for the further protections embodied in
judicial review. See Fisher I, supra note 91, at 24. For a general discussion of these
theories, see R. Henningsen, supra note 34, at 78-79; Comment, supra, at 286-89.
95. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935). See generally Note, supra note
60, at 188-89 (discussing effect of contract and grace theories on probationer's right to
appeal conditions of probation).
96. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
97. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 222 (1932); Escoe, 295 U.S. at 493.
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erosion of the restrictive rights theories during the late 1960's and early
1970's that the door opened for the introduction of procedural protec-
tions.98 Elimination of the restrictive theories eroded the credibility of
the remaining resistance and eventually gave rise to the sentiment that no
valid justification existed for the denial of procedural due process in the
context of revocation.99
As a result of this gradual rejection, the Supreme Court in Morrissey
recognized the need to establish procedural due process guidelines for
parole revocation hearings."° The Morrissey requirements imposed six
basic procedural protections on the revoking tribunal, 1 ' one of which,
the written statement requirement, has presented a great deal of interpre-
tive difficulty.1"2 While the Court in Morrissey set forth the necessary
contents of such a statement-the evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking probation' 3-the Court failed to designate the precise form
that would satisfy this requirement.
III. THE WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIREMENT
The Morrissey Court promulgated due process requirements to protect
the essential liberty interests at stake in a revocation hearing."° The
Court prescribed the written statement requirement as a means of ensur-
ing that, in appearance and reality, the revocation comports with ideals
of fairness."0 5
Accordingly, a factual basis must support the revocation decision. 10 6
The written statement enables the individual probationer to understand
the grounds for the revocation107 and also provides the record upon
which to prepare for appeal.'10 By enabling an appellate court to review
98. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (4th Cir. 1969); Jack-
son v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1968).
99. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484.
100. See id. at 482.
101. See id. at 486-89; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (delineating Morris-
sey requirements).
102. See, e.g., Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209-10 (10th Cir. 1983); Saunders v.
United States, 508 A.2d 92, 98 & n.ll (D.C. 1986); see also infra notes 105-188 and
accompanying text.
103. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
104. See id. The Court, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), extended the
Morrissey protections to probation revocation hearings, finding that parole and probation
revocation raised identical constitutional implications. Id. at 782 n.3. Therefore, this
Note treats the Morrissey holding as directly applicable to probation revocations.
105. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); accord Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
106. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 614 (1985); Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d
450, 457-58 (8th Cir. 1976); cf United States v. Williams, 668 F.2d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir.
1981) (judge's acceptance of unreliable information for sentencing violates defendant's
due process rights).
107. See Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1975); Rastelli v. Warden, 610
F. Supp. 961, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), reversed in part, 782 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1986).
108. See Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 97-98 & n.9 (D.C. 1986); cf. Wolff v.
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the trial court's reasons for revocation, a written statement that sets out
all the relevant facts and evidence protects against arbitrary and
capricous revocations of probation."°9 Moreover, in addition to protect-
ing against the grievous loss caused by an erroneous deprivation of lib-
erty, 110 a written statement reduces the possibility of collateral effects,
such as inability to contribute financially to family support,II' that could
result from an improper termination of probation. Thus, the main con-
cern behind the written statement requirement is a desire to ensure pro-
tection of the liberty interest itself; the chosen method-the separate
written statement-simply provides a means for achieving this goal.
Therefore, an alternative method that equally protects the probationer's
liberty interest would satisfy the prescription of the Supreme Court.
A. A Written Transcript Offers a Constitutionally Adequate Substitute
for the Written Statement Requirement
In promulgating the due process requirements for revocation hearings,
the Morrissey decision, through Gagnon, elevated the status of the proba-
tioner's interest from a privilege 1 2 to a protected liberty interest.'
Morrissey, however, did not indicate that any form be rigidly followed."' 4
Rather, the Court emphasized a desire to keep the revocation proceed-
ings informal and flexible," Is cautioning that the revocation process is not
a criminal adjudication." 6
Although circumstances exist in which due process requires an expla-
nation for the reasons underlying a decision,"' the existence of other
procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of unfairness weakens the
justification for imposing an inflexible mandate upon the judge. 118 In the
probation revocation context, Gagnon, extending Morrissey, established
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) (espousing similar rationale in context of prison
disciplinary matters). But see N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 157 (verbatim
transcript does not "appreciably minimize" probability of erroneous hearing).
109. See Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977).
110. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); see also supra notes 77-78.
111. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482; Best & Birzon, supra note 62, at 810. (citing Na-
tional Probation and Parole Ass'n Advisory Council of Judges). In addition, loss of pro-
bation further discourages potential employers from hiring the defendant when she is
ultimately released from prison. See Fisher II, supra note 91, at 52.
112. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
113. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-82.
114. Seeid.
115. See id at 490.
116. See icL at 480; id at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
117. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344 & n.10, 345 (1981).
118. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (citing Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S.
339, 344-45 (1981)). In Black, the separate written statement eliminated the need for an
additional enunciation of other options to incarceration. Id. at 616.
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six procedural safeguards.' 1 9 The presence of these other protections re-
laxes the rigidity otherwise necessary in construing the written statement
requirement. 20 Adherence to rigid procedures undercuts flexibility-the
touchstone of due process. 2' In light of these motivations and concerns,
the verbatim transcript satisfies the underlying purposes of the written
statement requirement.
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue adopt the view
that the transcript may substitute for the written statement if the record
includes the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the revocation. 122
A written verbatim transcript provides the evidence, 123 reasoning, 124 and
conclusions of the proceeding, 25 thereby offering the identical informa-
tion supplied by the separate written statement.126 A written transcript,
therefore, qualifies as a constitutionally acceptable method of satisfying
due process dictates. 27 When a variety of interpretive alternatives exist,
preference for one form may suggest that it constitutes a superior method
of compliance with constitutional strictures. 28 The courts, however, do
not weigh preference in the determination of constitutional adequacy. 129
On appeal, the reviewing court will uphold a decision, provided the court
below employed a constitutionally adequate method. 130
An argument frequently advanced in favor of the separate written
statement cites the utility of the separate written statement in minimizing
the risk of an erroneous termination of probation.' 3 ' Nevertheless, by
transcribing everything that takes place at the hearing, including the
119. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972)); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
120. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490.
121. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3252; supra note 87 and accompanying text.
122. See Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209-10 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (per curiam); United States v.
Lacey, 648 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
123. See Blake v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 186, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 489
F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 639-40
(listing other benefits of verbatim transcript); see also infra notes 133-35 and accompany-
ing text.
124. See United States v. Rilliet, 595 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Blake v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 186, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1402 (5th
Cir. 1974); accord Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 96-97 (D.C. 1986); Soden v.
State, 71 Md. App. 1, 6 n.4, 523 A.2d 1015, 1017 n.4 (1987); infra notes 133-35 and
accompanying text.
125. See United States v. Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 745 n.l (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981);
Blake v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 186, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1402 (5th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); see also infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
126. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 641.
127. See United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct 1239 (1988) (mem.); Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 98 (D.C. 1986); Soden
v. State, 71 Md. App. 1, 6 n.4, 523 A.2d 1015, 1017 n.4 (1987).
128. See Yancey, 827 F.2d at 89; Saunders, 508 A.2d at 98 n.12.
129. See Yancey, 827 F.2d at 89; Saunders, 508 A.2d at 98-99 & n.12.
130. See Yancey, 827 F.2d at 89; Saunders, 508 A.2d at 98-99.
131. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
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judge's oral pronouncements, the transcript reflects the court proceeding
and protects against judicial, as well as procedural, impropriety. 132 If the
transcript fails to reflect the reasons for the revocation, 133 or the review-
ing court cannot discern the reasons for the revocation,'3 a separate
written statement must explain these reasons. 3 5
Economic realities underlie the growing acceptability of a verbatim
transcript. Because the verbatim transcript includes the requisite infor-
mation,13 6 issuing a separate statement proves duplicative, creating un-
necessary expense.' 37 While the problem of additional expense does not
necessarily justify the use of procedures that fall below optimal constitu-
tional standards, 31 the existence of substitute procedures that fulfill the
constitutional mandate, while simultaneously preserving institutional re-
sources, offers a viable alternative.' 39
Courts should interpret Morrissey's written statement requirement to
be satisfied by the verbatim transcript available in every court of rec-
ord." A strict interpretation of the Morrissey standards runs contrary
to the spirit of flexibility with which the Supreme Court promulgated the
Morrissey and Gagnon due process requirements.' 4 ' By incorporating
778, 786 (1973). When revocation of a liberty interest rests on the occurrence of particu-
lar events, legal process functions to ensure the veracity of those events.
Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which [legal process] must apply,
flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum
and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to
serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
132. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 90-91.
133. See Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209-10 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
134. See United States v. Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 744-45 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)
(per curiam); United States v. Lacey, 648 F.2d 441, 444-45 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
135. An allegation that the trial judge failed to issue a separate written statement arises
on appeal. It is the reviewing court that makes a determination of the adequacy of the
statement issued and determines whether or not the deficiency requires reversal or simply
a remand to enter the additional facts and reasons. See, eg., Morishita v. Morris, 702
F.2d 207, 209-10 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming); Martinez, 650 F.2d at 744 (remanding);
Lacey, 648 F.2d at 444-45 (remanding); Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 716, 719
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (remand sufficient to correct procedural defect).
136. See United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct 1239 (1988) (mem.).
137. Cf Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 227 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ad-
ministrative burdens and expense can be minimized through "'skillful use of personnel
and facilitites.'" (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970)); see also supra
note 135; infra note 142.
138. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
139. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
140. See supra note 22; see also Fed. R. App. P. 10 (b)(l) (requiring appellant to order
transcript from district court for appeal).
141. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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the evidence presented,' 42 the reasons for revocation, 43 and the evidence
relied upon for the conclusion,'" the verbatim transcript provides a con-
stitutionally adequate substitute. If, on appeal, the reviewing court de-
termines that no factual basis supports the revocation decision, it has the
power to correct this mistake by remanding or overturning the lower
court decision.' 45 Issuing a separate written statement, therefore, results
in duplicative effort and unnecessary expenditure of institutional re-
sources. Moreover, the transcript also protects against collateral conse-
quences of an improper termination. A verbatim transcript thus fulfills
all the functions of a separate written statement, 46 thereby preserving
the probationer's due process protections.
B. Erroneous Justifications Underlie Strict Adherence to the Separate
Written Statement Requirement
The jurisdictions that adopt the separate written statement approach
base their reasoning on the belief that the dictates of Morrissey and
Gagnon must be construed strictly.' 47 These courts read Morrissey as
applied through Gagnon to say that one of the minimum requirements of
due process is a separate written statement' 48 and that this statement
must issue before probation may be revoked.' 49 Failure to follow these
142. See Blake v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 186, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 489
F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 640.
143. See United States v. Rilliet, 595 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Blake, 372 F. Supp. at 190; Saunders v. United States, 508 A.2d 92, 98 (D.C. 1986);
Soden v. State, 71 Md. App. 1, 6 n.4, 523 A.2d 1015, 1017 n.4 (1987).
144. See United States v. Martinez, 650 F.2d 744, 745 n.1 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981);
Blake v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 186, 190 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1402 (5th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam). But see Merritt, Parole Revocation: A Primer, 11 U. Tol. L. Rev.
893, 936 (1980) (transcript fails to clearly indicate which evidence judge relied upon for
decision, since transcripts include contentions of both parties).
145. See supra note 135.
146. See United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct 1239 (1988) (mem.); United States v. Rilliet, 595 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); State v. Moreno, 21 Ariz. App. 462, 465, 520 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1974); State
v. Fortier, 20 Or. App. 613, 615, 533 P.2d 187, 190 (1975); State v. Myers, 86 Wash. 2d
419, 429, 545 P.2d 538, 544 (1976) (en banc).
147. See United State v. Bonanno, 452 F. Supp 743, 747 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd mem.,
595 F.2d 1229 (1979); Joiner v. State, 454 So. 2d 1048, 1049 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984);
Taylor v. State, 405 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Borst v. State, 377 So. 2d 3, 4
(Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Armstrong v. State, 312 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (Ala. 1975); id. at
628 (Maddox, J., concurring specially); Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 716, 719
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Baumgardner v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985).
148. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 405 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Armstrong v.
State, 312 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (Ala. 1975); id. at 628 (Maddox, J., concurring specially);
Baumgardner, 687 S.W.2d at 561.
149. See, e.g., Joiner v. State, 454 So. 2d 1048, 1049 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Taylor v.
State, 405 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App.); Borst v. State, 377 So. 2d 3, 4 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1979); Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986);
Baumgardner v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
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express requirements must result in reversal and remand. °50 This inter-
pretation, however, fails to consider the fundamental concern for judicial
flexibility enunciated simultaneously with the procedural require-
ments.'51 Strict adherence to precedent vitiates this notion of flexibil-
ity,152 frustrating the law's ability to adapt to the demands of present
conditions and realities. 53
While commitment to stare decisis forms the primary justification for
strict adherence to the separate written statement requirement,'5 sup-
porters of a strict interpretation can glean additional support from analo-
gous Supreme Court authority.'55 In Wolff v. McDonnell,I56 the Court
acknowledged that deprivation of a prisoner's "good time" credits consti-
tuted a matter of considerable importance.' 7 Despite the Court's refusal
to equate deprivation of "good time" credits with parole revocation,' 58 it
adopted two of the Morrissey requirements as prerequisites to minimum
due process: "advance notice of the claimed violation and a written
statement of the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reason
for the disciplinary action taken."' 59 Proponents of the separate written
statement requirement, therefore, might argue that the Supreme Court
has recognized the separate written statement as one of the most funda-
mental procedural protections. t '
While Wolff appears to lend support to the view that due process re-
quires that a separate written statement issue in probation revocation
cases, even those before a court of record, reliance on this case is mis-
placed. Wolff involved hearings before an administrative agency,' 6'
where a written transcript of the proceeding is not always required or
available. 162 Such situations leave the defendant without any record of
150. See Joiner v. State, 454 So. 2d 1048, 1049 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Austin v.
State, 375 So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Borst v. State, 377 So. 2d 3, 4 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979).
151. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
153. See Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); cf L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1475 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing Supreme Court's overturning of separate-but-equal precedent).
154. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
155. The relevance of parole cases in light of Gagnon's adoption of the Morrisey re-
quirements and rationale underscores their applicability in the probation context. See
supra notes 12, 104 and accompanying text. Prison disciplinary matters also provide
analogous support arising from the importance of the written statement requirement.
See, eg., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974) (written statement required for
deprivation of "good time" credits).
156. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
157. See id at 561. For a complete discussion of Wolffand its implications, see Note,
The Written Statement Requirement of Wolff v. McDonnell: An Argument for Factual
Specificity, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 943 (1987).
158. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561.
159. See id at 563.
160. See id at 564-65.
161. See id at 544-53, 548 n.8.
162. See, e.g., United States ex reL Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 710 (7th Cir.
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the proceeding or summation of the evidence presented against her. This
severely jeopardizes the inherent fairness of the proceeding and frustrates
the ability to evaluate grounds for appellate review 63 and to prepare an
adequate defense in contemplation of such an appeal.'" 4 In mandating
the separate written statement, the Wolff Court responded to the com-
plete absence of substitute procedural protections.' 65 Thus, Wolff differs
from probation revocation proceedings before a court of record where a
transcript of the proceeding routinely is available.' 66 This distinction un-
dermines Wolff's applicability as persuasive authority in determining the
procedural requirements before a court of record.
The minority view also focuses on the importance of the independent
written statement. The courts following this view clearly articulate the
two purposes that justify its issuance: facilitation of judicial review,' 67
and promotion of thought by the fact finders, compelling them to high-
light relevant points and to separate irrelevant or unimportant issues
present in the record. 6 ' Rationale gleaned from analogous cases requir-
ing the issuance of a written statement prior to the curtailment of a lib-
erty interest provides two additional reasons to support this minority
position: promotion of rehabilitation, 69 and establishment of a body of
rules, 70 precedents, and principles promoting consistency. 7'
1973) (for prison disciplinary infraction only written statement received by inmate was
one or two sentences on the original conduct report), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting judicial requirement of
recorded hearing and written decision for every serious prison disciplinary proceeding),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
163. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
164. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 640.
165. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1974) (no indication that inmate
ever received written statement by Committee as to evidence or reasons underlying disci-
plinary action taken).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1982). While Morrissey is silent on the issue of who must
receive a copy of the revocation hearing report, many jurisdictions provide for the proba-
tioner to receive a copy of the report. See N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 643-
44. Under doctrines espoused by the Supreme Court, an indigent would receive the tran-
script free of charge. See Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). Problems that might arise if the courts determined that a fee
should be charged for the transcript are beyond the scope of this Note.
167. See United States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 1985); Kartman v. Par-
ratt, 535 F.2d 450, 457-58 (8th Cir. 1976); N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 639;
cf Nebraska Penal Inmates v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1282-83 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd,
442 U.S. 1 (1979) (prison release context).
168. See United States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1985) judge did not
indicate which of two asserted violations, or if both, contained in record constituted the
basis for revocation); cf Greenholtz, 576 F.2d at 1282-83 (parole determination); Haymes
v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
169. N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 34, at 639-40; cf Greenholtz, 576 F.2d at 1282-
83.
170. See Greenholtz, 576 F.2d at 1282-83. Morrissey specifically determined that the
promulgation of procedure rested with the individual state legislatures. See Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972); id. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (court does
not sit as procedural "ombudsman" to the state).
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In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 72 the Supreme Court re-
jected reliance on these factors as absolute justification for a separate
written statement in a case involving parole release. 73 The Court deter-
mined that when a decision involves agency discretion, reviewing courts
should remain reluctant to impose any undue burden, such as issuance of
a separate written statement, that might interfere with the free exercise of
the administrative function.' 74
Although the judicial system governs probation decisions, initial pro-
bation determinations involve considerable discretion."' The judicial
discretion implicated in probation administration does not rise to the
same level of deference accorded agency actions. 76 Probation, however,
as reflected in the construction of the probation statute, 177 initially grants
the sentencing judge a degree of freedom far greater than that tradition-
ally exercised in prisoner matters. 78 The sentencing court still presides
171. See Greenholtz, 576 F.2d at 1282-83. The Eighth Circuit consistently has man-
dated the written statement in probation revocation as well as prison disciplinary matters.
See, eg., United States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1985).
172. 442 U.S. 1 (1979). In Greenholtz, the Nebraska Board of Parole challenged the
Nebraska parole release statute, see id at 5-6, and the trial court ruling that every adverse
parole decision include a written statement of the evidence relied upon. See id. at 14.
The Court emphasized that parole release could not be equated with parole revocation.
See id at 9. A critical distinction exists between losing a conditional liberty one already
enjoys and losing the chance for a conditional liberty one desires. Id But see id. at 19
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (parole release as important to
prisoner as parole revocation). While the Court determined that the statute under scru-
tiny created some liberty interest entitled to a measure of procedural protection, see id. at
12, the Court noted that each state's statute must be individually examined to determine
if such a liberty interest exists. Id. Nevertheless, the Greenholtz majority concluded that
the procedural protections provided by the statute passed constitutional scrutiny. See id
at 16.
173. See id at 13 (imposition of too many burdens on state may prompt abolition of
parole commissions).
174. See id
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 3562(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (court determines whether to impose a
confinement or award probation). The legislative history indicates that the sentencing
reforms were meant to provide guidelines for the sentencing judge. See S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3235.
In her judgment, the judge may still choose to override the guidelines in conformity with
the particular circumstances. Id
176. See K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 28.1-28.15 (2d ed. 1984) (discuss-
ing reviewability of agency decisions); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 609 (1976)
(courts reluctant to substitute their discretion for that of an agency). Cf Dubois v.
Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1987) (" 'agency charged with administering the
statute is entitled to considerable deference'" (quoting Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (construing Federal Water
Pollution Control Act))).
177. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 221 (1932) (only limitation as to grant
or modification of probation: not to exceed five years); see also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3221.
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) ("court may... place defendant on probation...
upon such terms ... as the court deems best"); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 88,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3221 (discussing "unfetterred
and sweeping" discretion afforded judges from lack of statutory guidance).
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over the revocation decision. 79 Arguably, this illustrates a desire to
delegate great discretion to the trier of fact, already well-acquainted with
the substantive and procedural history of the case.' 80 Consequently, the
concern for discretion that motivated the Court in Greenholtz provides
analogous support for discretion and flexibility within the realm of pro-
bation revocation.
Greenholtz also rejects the separate written statement requirement be-
cause it would- tend to convert parole determination into an adversarial
proceeding resembling guilt determination."' Likewise, the probation
decision follows guilt determination,18 2 and therefore does not constitute
part of the criminal prosecution. 183 This common distinction provides
additional support for the notion that the nonadjudicative nature of the
revocation proceedings deserves a greater degree of deference.
The minority approach demonstrates a staunch adherence to form
over substance, without legitimate justification.' 84 While on first impres-
sion the rationales cited by those espousing this view may seem well-
founded, closer examination reveals that this position fails to provide any
overriding concerns or policy arguments to justify issuing a separate
written statement. 8 5 While the minority correctly assesses the purposes
behind the written statement, 8 6 none of the functions suggested exceed
179. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3601, 98 Stat. 1837, 2001 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3601
(Supp. III 1985)); Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 3663(b), (d) 98 Stat. 1837, 2002 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3603(b), 3603(g) (Supp. III 1985)) (sentencing court retains jurisdiction over
probationer).
180. Cf United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1131 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J.,
concurring) (sentencing judges traditionally given wide discretion "by virtue of their
knowledge of the circumstances of a criminal case," which puts them "in the best posi-
tion to impose a penalty, taking into account the individual conditions of the defendant
and the nature of his crime" (footnotes omitted)), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978);
Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79, 80, 84-86 (1965) (opportunity to
observe and interview both defendant and witnesses allows judge to make informed
assessments).
181. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979).
182. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973); cf Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole follows guilt determination).
183. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-82; cf Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-84 (revocation
hearing not part of the criminal prosecution); see also supra note 5 (distinguishing revoca-
tion hearing from criminal proceeding).
184. In upholding the separate written statement requirement, one judge stated: "I
think we all know that the trial judge relied on the testimony... in revoking Armstrong's
probation... but one of the Gagnon standards does say that the factfinder... must make
a written statement; therefore, I think this written record needs to be made for whatever
benefit, if any.. . ." Armstrong v. State, 312 So. 2d 620, 628 (Ala. 1975) (Maddox, J.,
concurring specially).
185. See, eg., Taylor v. State, 405 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Armstrong,
312 So. 2d at 630 (Maddox, J., concurring specially) ("I do not understand why a trial
judge should be required to [issue a separate written statement] but Gagnon does set it out
as a standard").
186. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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the scope of a verbatim transcript. 87 Issuance of a separate written
statement, therefore, increases the burden on the judiciary, depleting val-
uable institutional resources. In light of these criticisms, adherence to
precedent remains the only justification that supports this view. This
reasoning contradicts the Morrissey admonition against rigidity and the
predeliction of the courts in general toward flexibility in evaluating pro-
cedural due process. 8 1
C. Policy Concerns and the Balancing Test
Any decision affecting the extent of procedural due process also re-
quires courts to balance society's institutional needs against the constitu-
tional protections of the individual.s 9 Such a balancing test "must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by gov-
ernmental action."'1 90
In cases implicating procedural due process, courts employ the balanc-
ing test in three basic areas: 19' to determine whether an individual must
receive a hearing prior to a termination that constitutes deprivation of
life, liberty or property;192 to determine the exact procedures required at
the hearing; 93 and, in an adversarial proceeding, to determine the stan-
dard of proof necessary to support the termination.' 94 Under each, three
basic factors must be analyzed and weighed: the private interest at stake;
the public interest in the present system, including the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens of alternate methods; and the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion as a result of procedures employed, as compared with the value of
additional or substitute methods. 95
The private interest segment of the balancing test addresses the proba-
tioner's concerns. The probationer posesses an overriding interest in pro-
tecting "a status that is considerably more desirable than that of a
187. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
188. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 490 (1972); see also supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
189. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
190. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
191. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 561-62 (2d ed. 1983);
see also Rotunda II, supra note 75, at 460-61 (discussing due process requirements in
criminal justice system).
192. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
193. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973) (determining whether
indigent entitled to counsel at probation revocation hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 487-89 (1972) (setting forth parole revocation hearing guidelines).
194. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979).
195. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d
86, 98 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). The Mathews test has evolved as the
standard for determining the scope and timing of due process protections. See Campo v.
New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1988).
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
prisoner."196 Probation revocation appears on the probationer's record
and affects his reputation upon ultimate release from prison. 197 There-
fore, revocation of probation severely limits employment opportuni-
ties, 1 s as well as opportunities to participate in community-based
rehabilitive programs.' 99 Thus, the probationer seeks appropriate pro-
tection to prevent erroneous termination and the personal ramifications
inherent in such a decision.
The public interest involves the rehabilitive function of probation2°°
and the maintenance of adequate due process to ensure that the system
fosters rehabilitation.2' Society also has a vested interest in conserving
valuable institutional resources.20 2 If the choice exists between two pro-
cedures that provide the same level of protection, it is preferable to select
that alternative that eliminates unnecessary expenditure of fiscal re-
sources. 20 3 Thus, society must strive to reconcile two significant interests
without compromising either.
The risk of erroneous deprivation-the final prong of the balancing
analysis--does not adversely affect the validity of the verbatim tran-
script. 2°4 Both the separate statement and the written transcript include
information that safeguards the integrity of the judicial process, as well
as the factual veracity of the underlying decision. 20  As a result, use of
the written transcript in place of the separate written statement does not
increase the risk that the probation revocation rests upon faulty
206
reasoning.
The relative interests of both the probationer and society nevertheless
implicate serious considerations. 2 7 The interests of society in utilizing
the substitute procedure outweigh those of the probationer because the
verbatim transcript advances the interests of society without jeopardizing
196. United States v. ex rel Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079,
1087 (2d Cir.) (quoting Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 103 (6th Cir. 1968) (Celebreze, J.,
dissenting)), vacated, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
197. See Fisher II, supra note 91, at 52.
198. See Fisher II, supra note 91, at 52; supra note 465 and accompanying text.
199. See J. Smykla, supra note 31, at 218-20.
200. Cf Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) ("[S]ociety has a further inter-
est in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will
enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." (citing Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Re-
port: Corrections 83, 88 (1967))).
201. See id.
202. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
203. See id. at 261-63 (determining that procedures used were not constitutionally ade-
quate and therefore, conservation of fiscal resources was not a sufficient consideration tojustify summary terminations); see, e.g., People v. Cozad, 158 I11. App. 3d. 664, 675, 511
N.E.2d 211, 219 (requirement that judge specify one of two identical grounds for revoca-
tion rejected as wasteful), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 115 (1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct.
1233 (1988).
204. See supra note 140-46 and accomapanying text.
205. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
206. See Armstrong v. State, 312 So. 2d 620, 630 (Ala. 1975) (Maddox, J., concurring).
207. Cf Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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those of the probationer. Where an individual may avail herself of other
protections, the private interest that may be affected by an erroneous ter-
mination is less likely to cause undue hardship.208 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has established that where procedural costs significantly
outweigh the countervailing benefits, due process does not mandate the
implementation of such procedure.2 °9
CONCLUSION
The final probation revocation hearing determines issues that substan-
tially affect the probationer and society. Society's interest in the proce-
dure adopted stems from the desire to protect probation as a valuable
rehabilitative tool. Minimizing the rigidity of the form of the written
statement enhances this goal. A verbatim transcript provides the proba-
tioner with alternate protection, not less protection. A verbatim tran-
script of the proceedings that records the judge's oral statements, citing
the reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon, satisfies the re-
quirements set out by Morrissey and its progeny. Requiring a separate
written statement when a verbatim transcript exists subverts the court's
desire to refrain from creating formal and rigid requirements. Allowing
a reporter's transcript to fulfill the written statement requirement reduces
administrative burdens and expense.
In balancing the interests of society against those of the probationer,
the balance militates in favor of the verbatim transcript. Although the
concern for procedural protections weighs heavily in favor of the proba-
tioner, the value of the substitute method outweighs these concerns. The
verbatim transcript protects against the possibility of erroneous depriva-
tion with force equal to that of a separate written statement. Reducing
institutional burdens alone rarely constitutes a legitimate justification for
reducing procedural protections. It does, however, become a viable con-
sideration when the availablity of alternative means eliminates the risk of
unfairly abrogating constitutional protections. The verbatim transcript
constitutes a substitute method that satisfies these two competeting inter-
ests, and as a result, the balance tips in favor of its use. A verbatim
transcript constitutes a harmless departure from a literal interpretation
208. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-43 (1976). In the case of disability
benefits, for example, the Mathews Court weighed heavily the fact that the recipient
whose benefits were terminated could receive other forms of government assistance. Id.
at 340-44. In determining whether due process required an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination, the Court balanced the fiscal and administrative burdens against the benefits.
Id at 347-49. Finding the costs significantly outweighed the countervailing benefits, the
Court determined that due process did not mandate such a procedure. Id at 347-49; see
also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1978) (applying
Mathews balancing test).
209. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.
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of the Morrissey written statement requirement and qualifies as a consti-
tutionally adequate substitute within the contemplation of the courts.
Mihal Nahari
